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REFLECTIONS ON COERCING PRIVACY
NEAL DEVINS*
Should privacy be a matter of coercion? Anita Allen thinks so,
and her provocative essay Coercing Privacy' explains why. For
Allen, "although the liberal conception of private choice is flour-
ishing.., the liberal conception of privacy is not."2 In other
words, society's increasing tolerance of alternative lifestyles (pri-
vacy of choice) is not enough; privacy cannot withstand the at-
tack from within, that is, from individuals who-while empow-
ered to lead private lives-do not value their privacy. Making
matters worse, Allen thinks it "too difficult" to turn this tide of
diminished expectations through "preaching and teaching."' Con-
sequently, Allen calls for regulatory measures that allow people
to "experience privacy" and thereby live more genuinely expres-
sive lives.'
No doubt, desperate times sometimes call for desperate mea-
sures. Nevertheless, as I will argue below, Allen's proposal is
unworkable. Institutional limitations in governmental decision-
making make the successful implementation of Allen's proposal
little more than a pipe dream. Rather than protecting and serv-
ing the liberal conception of privacy, Allen's call to regulate pri-
vacy almost certainly will limit types of privacy that Allen and
other liberals deem essential to self-expression and, with it, self-
definition.
* Ernest W. Goodrich Professor of Law and Lecturer in Government, College of
William and Mary. These comments track remarks made at the Institute of Bill of
Rights Law's April 1998 symposium, "Reconstructing Liberalism." Thanks to Cynthia
Ward for organizing the conference and helping me think through these comments.
Thanks also to Anita Allen and Linda McClain for writing such good pieces.
1. Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. Rnv. 723 (1999).
2. Id- at 727-28.
3. Id. at 735.
4. Id- at 756; see also i at 755 (arguing for government intervention in private
lives to preserve the values of privacy).
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I. Is GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION NECESSARY TO
COUNTERMAND THE EROSION OF PRIVACY?
Let me start with the quite plausible assumption that Allen is
correct and that some government-sponsored invasions of priva-
cy may be necessary to protect privacy from itself. After all, in
this age of cybersex, the JenniCam website, MTV's The Real
World, Jerry Springer, and the like, it may be that the liberal
commitment to privacy is best served by a government that
sometimes leaves us alone (privacy of choice) and sometimes
protects us from doing what we want (privacy). Allen's proposal
cannot escape the inherent limitations of governmental deci-
sionmaking.
Allen commits error in assuming the possibility of a benefi-
cent government able to overcome its prejudices, and thereby
expand privacy of choice, while simultaneously limiting personal
autonomy in ways consistent with liberal ideals. This assump-
tion does not wash. To counteract false stereotypes about, say,
women who choose to abort their fetuses or same-sex relation-
ships, it may well be necessary for the private to be made public.
Social reform, as Linda McClain notes, sometimes requires "self-
disclosures and confessions."'
An inverse relationship between privacy and privacy of choice
may well be endemic to our imperfect world. Tolerance of alter-
native lifestyles requires exposure to those lifestyles. Abortion
rights and gay rights illustrate this phenomenon.
A. Abortion Rights
Before 1962, the prospect of public support for abortion rights
seemed remote.6 That year, Sherri Finkbine-a pregnant twen-
ty-nine year old Arizona woman and married mother of
four-sought an abortion after learning that her taking of the
medicine thalidomide likely would result in severe deformities to
the baby she was carrying. Unable to have an abortion in Arizona,
5. Linda C. McClain, Reconstructive Tasks for a Liberal Feminist Conception of
Privacy 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 759, 790 (1998).
6. See Barbara Hinkson Craig & David M. O'Brien, ABORTION AND AMERICAN
POLITics 39-41 (1993).
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Finkbine travelled to Sweden, had an abortion, and learned that
her fetus was severely deformed.7 With extensive news coverage,
Finkbine's "very public ordeal... altered the national conscious-
ness concerning abortion."' In particular, because Finkbine
seemed "'the perfect suburban housewife and mother,'" journal-
ists began to treat abortion as a sometimes unavoidable human
tragedy, not the subject of crime news.9
Three years later, in 1965, an epidemic of rubella again pro-
pelled the abortion issue into the national consciousness. Be-
cause rubella was linked to birth defects, a significant number of
married, middle class, stay-at-home housewives sought abor-
tions.10 With The Atlantic, Time, Redbook, and Look magazines
publishing prominent stories about these women, public opinion
in support of abortion rights began to grow. A January 1966
Gallup poll, for example, uncovered that seventy-seven percent
of Americans supported some form of abortion rights.1 Undoubt-
edly, public exposure to these tragic stories affected public atti-
tudes and, ultimately, contributed to both legislative abortion
reform initiatives and the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v.
Wade.'2 In contrast, attempts by abortion opponents to vilify the
destruction of fetuses through films like The Silent Scream 3
have largely failed. Consequently, notwithstanding political chal-
lenges to Roe, abortion rights may well be more secure today
than ever before.
B. Gay Rights
Public acceptance of same-sex relationships is linked to the
"courageous entry [by gay men and lesbians] into the cultural
7. See DAVID J. GARRoW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALrY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND
THE MAKING OF ROE V. WADE 286, 288 (1994). For a detailed account of this story,
see i& at 285-90.
8. Id at 288.
9. Id at 288-89.
10. See ida at 300-01.
11. See id at 302.
12. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
13. This film, graphically depicting an abortion, first aired nationally on ABC's
Nightline. See Nightline (ABC television broadcast, Feb. 12, 1985).
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debate over same-sex relationships and sexuality."'4 For exam-
ple, through sympathetic media treatments of the real life sto-
ries of, among others, Margarethe Cammermeyer"5 and Sharon
Bottoms,'" most Americans have been exposed to positive images
of gays and lesbians.'7 Moreover, a spate of human interest sto-
ries in nearly all major newspapers, as well as Time, Newsweek,
and other newsmagazines, have portrayed same-sex couples as
committed both to each other and to raising a family. 8 Thanks
to this avalanche of media coverage, as Anita Allen and Linda
McClain recognize, there is increasing societal tolerance for
same-sex relationships. 9
In stark contrast, consider Bowers v. Hardwik,20 the 1986
repudiation of same-sex sodomy. Unable to see same-sex rela-
tionships as anything but abhorrent and deviant, the Bowers
majority closed itself to the possibility that homosexual sodomy
could occupy the same place for gays as intercourse does for
heterosexuals. 2' For Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (who cast the
decisive fifth vote in Bowers), homosexual relations simply were
incomprehensible.22 In a conversation with one of his clerks
(who, unbeknownst to Powell, was gay), Powell confided, "I don't
believe I've ever met a homosexual,'" and asked, "'[aire gay men
14. McClain, supra note 5, at 790.
15. See Serving in Silence: The Margarethe Cammermeyer Story (NBC television
broadcast, Feb. 6, 1995) (television movie depicting the case). Margarethe
Cammermeyer was a highly decorated military officer who was dismissed from the
Armed Services because of her lesbian orientation.
16. See Two Mothers for Zachary (ABC television broadcast, Sept. 22, 1996) (tele-
vision movie based on the case). Sharon Bottoms lost custody of her child because of
her lesbian orientation.
17. In addition to these made-for-television movies, Hollywood has embraced gay
rights through films such as Philadelphia, The Birdcage, and In and Out as well as
television programs such as Ellen and Roseanne.
18. See John Cloud, A Different Fathers' Day, TIME, Dec. 29, 1997, at 106; Gay
Couple Who Adopted Child Have Union Blessed, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, June 22, 1998, at
AS, available in 1998 WL 7779865; Margo Harakas, 'Gayby Boom,' CHI. TRIB., June
12, 1998, at 7, available in 1998 WL 2866170; Barbara Kantrowitz, Gay Families
Come Out, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 4, 1996, at 50; Ching-Ching Ni, Fathers' Day, NEWSDAY
(N.Y.), Mar. 1, 1998, at G8, available in 1998 WL 2683233.
19. See Allen, supra note 1, at 727; McClain, supra note 5, at 789-90.
20. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
21. See id. at 190-91.
22. See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 521 (1994).
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not [sexually] attracted to women at all?" 2 "What Powell found
so difficult to grasp," according to his biographer John Jeffries,
"was that homosexuality was not an act of desperation, not the
last resort of men deprived of women."24 In the words of his
clerk: "'He had no concept of it at all. He couldn't understand
the idea of sexual attraction between two men. It just had no
content for him.' 25
The lesson here is simple: Our society is not sufficiently toler-
ant to embrace an "anything goes" attitude toward lifestyle
choices. Consequently, abstract notions of privacy-even when
defended with vigor and eloquence-will not protect alternative
lifestyles. Rather, societal acceptance is necessary and, as such,
private lives must become public. Otherwise, false stereotypes,
not empathy, will rule the day. For this reason, Allen's call for
private lives to stay private may well be counterproductive.
II. THE LIMITS OF GOVERNMENT
In calling on government to validate private choices without
hearing the stories of individuals whose privacy is constrained,
Allen commits a second type of error. While it may be that pri-
vacy and private choice cannot flourish simultaneously without
enlightened governmental action, Allen never considers how
courts and elected officials shape public policy. After all, limita-
tions on religious observance, same-sex relationships, abortion,
and the like are the handiwork of elected government (often
with the judiciary's blessing). For that reason, rather than hope
that government will get it right," liberal liberals, like Allen,
23. Id.
24. Id
25. 1& In contrast, Powell joined the majority opinion in Roe because, while in
private practice, he "was moved" by the tragedy of a firm employee whose girlfriend
had died at the hands of a back-alley abortionist. See David Westin, Eulogy, TIME,
Sept. 7, 1998, at 29.
26. While recognizing that "one legitimately worries that public policies will penal-
ize certain behaviors unfairly" and, correspondingly, that "[flear of a government
misstep is sometimes a reason for recommending government inaction," Allen none-
theless argues for "public policymakers [to] begin to take account of the cumulative
effects of eroding privacy tastes and expectations, and weigh the risks of either do-
ing something or doing nothing." Allen, supra note 1, at 755-57. In asking govern-
ment to "weigh the risks" without specifying how government should "take account
1999] 799
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should take into account the social and political forces that ani-
mate governmental decisionmaking.
Compare, for example, the ways in which supporters of the
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)27 and opponents of Supreme
Court nominee Robert Bork spoke of marriage and parenting in
advancing their conflicting agendas. Bork opponents sought to
"pluck the heartstrings of [the] middle class" by having abortion
subsumed into the larger issue of privacy."8 This strategy was
implemented in a full-page ad that appeared in The Washington
Post, The New York Times, and other newspapers on the eve of
Bork's Senate testimony, September 14, 1987.29 Sponsored by
Planned Parenthood, the ad warned that the stakes of the Bork
nomination were "[d]ecades of Supreme Court decisions up-
hold[ing] your freedom to make your own decision about mar-
riage and family, childbearing and parenting" and that "[i]f the
Senate confirms Robert Bork, it will be too late. Your personal
privacy, one of the most cherished and unique features of Ameri-
can life, has never been in greater danger.""°
DOMA supporters likewise cautioned against radical changes
in marriage and parenting. In stark relief to anti-Bork forces,
however, the villain was judicially created privacy rights. Specif-
ically, fearful that courts would "redefine marriage" and thereby
fuel the flames of hedonism, narcissism, and self-centered moral-
ity,31 DOMA proponents fought fire with fire, speaking of hetero-
sexual marriage as "'the sure foundation of all that is stable and
noble in our civilization," including "responsible procreation and
child-rearing."32 In other words, by placing same-sex couples out
of the cumulative effects" of eroding tastes for and expectations of privacy, however,
Allen ultimately leaves it to government to do what it thinks best.
27. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 12, 13 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C-.AN. 2916,
2916-17.
28. MICHAEL PERTSCHUK & WENDY SCHAETZEL, THE PEOPLE RISING: THE CAM-
PAIGN AGAINST THE BORK NOMINATION 257 (1989) (quoting historian James
McPherson).
29. See Planned Parenthood, Robert Bork's Position on Reproductive Rights: You
Don't Have Any, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 1987, at A9.
30. Id
31. Marc Sandalow, Washington: A Village of Different Viewpoints, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRON., Dec. 29, 1996, at 9, available in 1996 WL 3234261 (quoting DOMA sponsor
Bob Barr (R-Ga.)).
32. H.R. REP. No. 104-664 at 12, 13, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2916-17; see
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of the mainstream, DOMA supporters-like the opponents of
Robert Bork before them-plucked at the heartstrings of the
middle class.
DOMA's passage and Bork's defeat, of course, underscore the
power of interest groups (with the backing of public opinion
polls) to get their way. More significantly (at least for Anita Al-
len), Congress's willingness to embrace sharply conflicting views
of private choice casts doubt on the government's ability to value
privacy when privacy is valuable and regulate it when it is not.
When it comes to elected officials, this conclusion seems no more
than a statement of the obvious. Yet it applies with equal force
to judges. Witness, for example, Planned Parenthood v. Casey.3 3
By manipulating stare decisis limitations to reaffirm abortion
rights and simultaneously gut Roe's stringent trimester test, the
Court placed politics ahead of principle. In particular, no longer
willing to pay the price for its absolutist ruling in Roe, the Court
sought to win popular approval by steering a middle ground on
abortion rights. Remarkably, the Court came close to conceding
this point. Acknowledging that its power lies "in its legitimacy, a
product of substance and perception that shows itself in the peo-
ple's acceptance of the Judiciary,"34 the Court seemed to believe
that "the public belief in the Court's institutional legitima-
cy-enhances public acceptance of controversial Court deci-
sions."3' This emphasis on public acceptance of the judiciary
seems proof positive that Supreme Court Justices, while not nec-
essarily following the election returns, cannot escape those social
and political forces that engulf them.
The point of all this is rather obvious: Big Brother cannot be
trusted. For liberal liberals, like Allen, it is risky business to call
also John E. Yang, House Votes to Curb Gay Marriages; Bitter Debate Precedes
Lopsided Outcome; Clinton Would Sign Bill, WASH. POST, July 13, 1996, at Al (quot-
4ng Representative Steve Largent's (R-Okla.) declaration that "no culture that has
ever embraced homosexuality has ever survived"):
33. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
34. Id. at 865.
35. Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of Discre-
tionary Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43
DUKE L.J. 703, 715 (1994). Lou Fisher and I have made a similar claim in another
essay. See Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability,
84 VA. L. REV. 83, 91-98 (1998).
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on government to strike a healthy balance between good and
bad privacy. While government may facilitate private choice
through funding and other measures, it is at least as likely that
government will set limits on private choice. Indeed, the saga of
abortion rights makes clear that government-including the ju-
diciary-is at least as likely to restrict private choice as it is to
protect it. For this reason, even if Allen is correct in suggesting
that government intervention is necessary to protect privacy
from itself, she nevertheless commits error both in pooh-poohing
"preaching and teaching" as "simply... too difficult" and in fail-
ing to define the contours of how government should act.36
III. THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHER KINGS AND QUEENS
That politicians (including judges) and interest groups behave,
well, like politicians and interest groups, of course, comes as no
surprise. What is surprising, I think, is the belief that any indi-
vidual has the capacity to sort out the parameters of a regulato-
ry scheme that appropriately values privacy of choice and priva-
cy. Consider, for example, Anita Allen-a talented, thoughtful,
well-meaning philosopher queen if there ever was one. Up until
now, I have focused on practicalities-that is, problems that
elected government may have in putting Anita Allen's vision of
privacy into effect. But what if she is wrong? For three quite dis-
tinctive reasons, I find some of Allen's suggestions problematic.
First, Allen might be willing to regulate out of existence good
kinds of privacy. Cybersex (something that clearly troubles Al-
len"7 ), for instance, offers "a [safe] place for sexual reconstruc-
tion" and, as such, appeals to "good kinds of privacy-that is,
privacy that allows persons to form and revise their identities
and to form associations."" In other words, the dignitarian and
consequentialist benefits of privacy of which Allen speaks may
not support government regulation of the kind Allen has in
mind.
Second, combatting bad forms of privacy-child abuse, for ex-
ample-may require a more intrusive governmental presence
36. Allen, supra note 1, at 735.
37. See Allen, supra note 1, at 730-31 & nn.32-35.
38. McClain, supra note 5, at 793.
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than Allen would allow. It is not enough to say that the
Deshaney problem ("public neglect of private violence""9 ) can be
solved by making "better use of evidence."4" Because parental
rights can be terminated only if there is clear and compelling
evidence of abuse,4 ' it may be necessary for the state to monitor
(through social service worker visits) homes where abuse is sus-
pected. Indeed, these visits may well be necessary to collect the
type of evidence of which Allen speaks.
Third, the cause of our diminished expectation of and taste for
privacy may be linked to the rise of the regulatory state and,
consequently, proposals to cure this problem through regulation
seem backwards.42 Put simply: the bigger the public sphere, the
less we look to the family and other private arrangements to
define our lives. Instead, we see our lives as public and, conse-
quently, have a diminished expectation of privacy.' The willing-
ness of liberal liberals at times to call for government regulation
of bad forms of privacy and speech is emblematic of the perva-
siveness of big government and, with it, our proclivity to look to
government as a panacea for whatever ill befalls us.44
* * *
How much privacy is appropriate? I, for one, do not have a
clue. I suspect, however, that others cannot come up with the
golden pass key, whether they be politicians affected by interest
group pressures or theorists who only care about getting the
right answer. In other words, while Anita Allen's instincts might
well be better than mine, I am nonetheless skeptical of Allen's
39. Allen, supra note 1, at 746 (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of
Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989)).
40. Id.
41. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982).
42. Thanks to John McGinnis for suggesting to me a link between big government
and our reduced taste for privacy.
43. Combusting with this tendency, the communications explosion (e.g., the
Internet, cable television) has called attention to this decline in privacy in ways that
were unimaginable a decade ago. See Allen, supra note 1, at 730.
44. See Neil A. Lewis, Switching Sides on Free Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26,
1998, at 4-1 (noting the changing views of some liberals as to whether government
should regulate certain forms of speech).
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suggestion "that regulatory measures aimed at curbing the cul-
ture of exposure... [could] be consistent with liberal values."45
From my vantage point, when the appropriate policy is undis-
cernible, the best solution is to leave the government out.
45. Allen, supra note 1, at 753. Allen, too, is skeptical but nevertheless encourages
government to pursue "a fresh line of thinking about privacy, culture, and regulative
norms." Ik at 757; see also supra note 26 (criticizing Allen's proposal that govern-
ment "take account of the cumulative effects" of eroding tastes for and expectations
of privacy).
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